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RETALIATORY EVICTION PROTECTION IN NEW YORK-
UNRAVELING SECTION 223-b
INTRODUCTION
An inherent conflict exists within the typical landlord-tenant relationship.
The landlord views renting as a business; the tenant regards the premises as
his home. These divergent interests become apparent when the landlord
decides that he no longer wishes to rent to the tenant. This private conflict
becomes a public concern when the landlord uses his power of eviction to
retaliate against tenants who have been active in improving their housing
conditions. Retaliatory eviction, a practice which "might have been called
anything; 'vengeful eviction' or, simply, 'getting even,' "I has caused great
concern among tenants in recent years. 2 The New York legislature responded
by enacting section 223-b of the Real Property Law,3 a statute designed to
prevent retaliatory eviction.
4
This Note examines the protections section 223-b gives tenants and ad-
dresses the problems which courts may face in applying the statute. Particular
attention will be given to the issues of establishing retaliatory motive and the
relief available once retaliatory eviction has been proven.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE RETALIATORY EVICTION PROHIBITION
A. The Development of Retaliatory Controls
Traditionally, tenants have had little recourse against the capricious behav-
ior of their landlords. A New York landlord could evict, for any reason, a
tenant who remained on the premises after the expiration of the lease or the
landlord's termination of a periodic tenancy- by means of an action in
1. Markese v. Cooper, 70 Misc. 2d 478, 479, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63, 66 (Monroe County Ct. 1972).
Because this type of eviction usually occurs at the end of a rental term or period, it has been
referred to as retaliatory termination. Levy, Adjusting the Economic Relationship of Landlord
and Tenant-Rent Alteration Remedies, 11 Urb. L. Ann., 155, 182 (1976).
2. E.g., Letter from Thatcher Homes Tenant Association to Gov. Hugh Carey (July 11, 1979)
(on file with the Fordham Law Review); Letter from Corn Hill People, United, Inc. to Gov. Hugh
Carey (July 9, 1979) (on file with the Fordham Law Review); Letter from New York State Rural
Housing Coalition to New York State Legislature (May 14, 1979) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
3. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b (McKinney Supp. 1979).
4. The new law is one of many enacted within the past few years designed to give tenants
greater rights. E.g., N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352-eee (McKinney Supp. 1979) (eviction protection
for tenants when premises are being converted to cooperatives or condominiums); N.Y. Real
Prop. Law § 226-b (McKinney Supp. 1979) (right to sublease or assign); N.Y. Real Prop. Law §
230 (McKinney Supp. 1979) (protection for membership in a tenants' association); N.Y. Real
Prop. Law § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1979) (warranty of habitability); N.Y. Real Prop. Law §
235-c (McKinney Supp. 1979) (protection for unconscionable lease or clause).
5. A tenant in possession without the permission of the landlord was considered a trespasser
at common law, Stern v. Equitable Trust Co., 238 N.Y. 267, 269, 144 N.E. 578, 578 (1924), and
is regarded as a holdover under present New York statutory law. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 232-c
(McKinney 1968). The landlord can either decide to make a new agreement with this tenant or to
evict. Id. Where there are provisions in a lease giving the tenant the right to a renewal of the
tenancy, however, the landlord cannot evict at the end of the rental term, Kuppers v. Tortora
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ejectment 6 or a summary proceeding.7 Tenants risked eviction for engaging in
activities that ran counter to the landlord's wishes, even if those activities
were lawful. More recently, however, several courts have restricted the right
of landlords to use eviction as a means of retaliation against their tenants.
The prohibition of retaliatory eviction derived from various policy and
constitutional grounds. For example, the landlord is not "free to evict in
retaliation for his tenant's report of housing code violations to the authori-
ties."'8 To do otherwise "would clearly frustrate the effectiveness [of housing
Agency, Inc., 63 Misc. 656, 659, 313 N.Y.S.2d 225, 227 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1970), and therefore the
retaliatory eviction issue would not arise.
6. Smith v. Littlefield, 51 N.Y. 539, 541 (1873).
7. The procedure through which a landlord can remove a tenant in summary form is
contained in New York's Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law, N.Y. Real Prop. Acts.
Law §§ 701-782 (McKinney 1979), and Real Property Law, N.Y. Real Prop. Law §§ 228, 232-a,
232-b, 232-c, (McKinney 1968). Section 711 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law
sets forth the grounds for removal of a tenant by a special proceeding. One basis of removal is a
tenant remaining in possession after expiration of the term without permission of the landlord.
N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law § 711(1) (McKinney 1979). In the case of a tenancy for a definite
term, there is no statutory notice of termination requirement. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 232-b
(McKinney 1968).
Proper notice is the sole requirement of termination in the case of periodic tenancies. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Real Prop. Law §§ 232-a, 232-b (McKinney 1968). Once it has been given and the tenant
holds over, the landlord can evict through a holdover summary proceeding. N.Y. Real Prop.
Law § 232-c (McKinney 1968). The mechanics of termination of a month-to-month periodic
tenancy are set forth by statute. N.Y. Real Prop. Law §§ 23.2-a, 232-b (McKinney 1968). In New
York City, a landlord must give a tenant written notice of at least 30 days; outside New York
City, at least one month's notice is required. Id. The length of notice of termination of other types
of periodic tenancies continue to be governed by common law. See 28 Mott St. Co. v. Summit
Import Corp., 64 Misc. 2d 860, 863, 316 N.Y.S.2d 259, 263 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1970). In a
year-to-year tenancy, for example, a landlord must give at least six months notice of termination.
Pugsley v. Aikin, 11 N.Y. 494, 497 (1854). Tenancies at will require written notice of not less
than 30 days. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 228 (McKinney 1968).
There were a few instances in which a landlord's right of eviction was limited even prior to this
retaliatory eviction prohibition. Three of these were noted by the court in Edwards v. Habib, 397
F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969). They concern: (1) where the
landlord is a governmental body, it cannot deprive tenants of due process; (2) where emergency
rent control legislation is in effect, landlord rights are restricted; (3) a landlord may not oust a
tenant in response to the tenant's exercise of voting rights. Id. at 689 n.5. Another exception in
New York involves legislation which prohibits eviction of a tenant for non-payment of rent if
housing code violations are present. N.Y. Mult. Resid. Law § 305-a (McKinney Supp. 1979);
N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law § 755 (McKinney 1979); N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 143-b (McKinney
1976); see Portnoy v. Hill, 57 Misc. 2d 1097, 1100, 294 N.Y S,2d 278, 281 (Binghamton City Ct.
1968). Nevertheless, a landlord can evict by waiving non-payment and then bringing a holdover
summary proceeding. This gap in the law was alluded to by the court in Markese v. Cooper, 70
Misc. 2d 478, 481, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63, 67 (Monroe County Ct. 1972). In addition, in New York
publicly assisted housing accomodations, the landlord may not discriminate against tenants
because of race or religion. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 18-c (McKinney 1976).
8. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1016 (1969);
accord, Robinson v. Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 862-63 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Schweiger v.
Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d, 507, 513-17, 476 P.2d 97, 100-03, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729, 732-35 (1970) (en
banc); Clore v. Fredman, 59 Ill. 2d 20, 27, 319 N.E.2d 18, 22 (1974); Markese v. Cooper, 70
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codes] as a means of upgrading the quality of housing."9 If a tenant knows
that a landlord could terminate his tenancy in response to the report of a
violation, he might hesitate and perhaps refrain from notifying authorities. In
addition, other tenants would be discouraged from taking similar action.' 0
Because housing code violations might thereby go unreported, the remedial
purpose of housing codes would be undermined."
Courts have also recognized that the first amendment secures a tenant's
rights to form a tenants' association, to discuss housing conditions with other
tenants, and to make complaints to public authorities. 12 This right cannot be
impaired by a court sanction of eviction.' 3 Accordingly, if a landlord insti-
tutes eviction procedures because of the tenant's participation in a tenants'
association or complaint, the eviction would be an unlawful infringement of a
tenant's exercise of his constitutional rights to hold meetings and report
violations. 14
Misc. 2d 478, 484, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63, 70 (Monroe County Ct. 1972); Dickhut v Norton, 45 Wis.
2d 389, 395-99, 173 N.W.2d 297, 301-02 (1970).
9. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687. 701 (D.C. Cir. 1968). cert. denied. 393 U S. 1016 (19691
10. Id.
11. Id. at 700-01. In Markese v. Cooper, 70 Misc. 2d 478. 333 N.Y.S.2d 63 (Monroe County
Ct. 1972), the court noted the generally prevalent shortage of building inspectors, which enhances
the need for tenants to notify governmental authorities of housing code violations. Id. at 483, 333
N.Y.S.2d at 69-70. In New York City, for example, housing inspectors declined in number from
700 in 1972 to 465 as of the end of 1979. Goodwin, Violations Rise in Neut Pattern Apartments,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1979, § B, at 1, col. 1, § B, at 7, col. 7.
12. See, e.g., Davis v. Village Park II Realty Co., 578 F.2d 461. 462-63 t2d Cir. 1978),
Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 694-96 (D.C. Cir. 1968). cert. denied. 393 U.S_ 1016 i1969);
Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501, 505-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); E. & E. Newman. Inc-
v. Hallock, 116 N.J. Super. 220, 225, 281 A.2d 544, 546 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971, Toms
Point Apts. v. Goudzward, 72 'Misc. 2d 629, 632, 339 N.Y.S.2d 281, 286 (Nassau County Dist.
Ct. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 79 Misc. 2d 206, 360 N.Y.S.2d 366 (App. Term 2d Dep't 1973),
Church v. Allen Meadows Apts., 69 Misc. 2d 254, 255, 329 N.Y.S.2d 148, 149 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
13. See, e.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 L.S-
1016 (1969); Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501, 507 (S.D.N.Y 1969), E. & E_
Newman, Inc. v. Hallock, 116 N.J. Super. 220. 225, 281 A.2d 544, 546 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1971); Church v. Allen Meadows Apts., 69 Misc. 2d 254, 255, 329 N.Y.S.2d 148, 149 (Sup. Ct.
1972). The reasoning is that "judicial action in private disputes is a form of state action" which
requires application of fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection requirements-
Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501, s05 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Therefore, "[al retaliatory
eviction would be judicial enforcement of private discrimination; it would require the application
of a rule of law that would penalize a person for the exercise of his constitutional rights " Id. at
506. Although all courts which banned retaliatory evictions on constitutional grounds implicitly
accepted this argument, at least one declared that judicial resolution of a retaliatory eviction
dispute is not a form of state action requiring the application of the fourteenth amendment,
Mullarkey v. Borglum, 323 F. Supp. 1218. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), and another held that a claim
of retaliation based on constitutional grounds cannot be raised in a summary proceeding. Lincoln
Square Apts., Inc. v. Davis, 58 Misc. 2d 292, 294, 295 N.Y.S.2d 358, 361 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1968),
aff'd, 64 Misc. 2d 859, 316 N.Y.S.2d 130 (App. Term Ist Dep't 1969).
14. See Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N Y. 1969). The court
explained that "It]here would be no point in a tenant trying to improve conditions in a building
that he would not be allowed to continue to live in. Permitting retaliatory evictions would thus
inhibit him in the exercise of his constitutional rights [and thereby] have a chilling effect." Id. at
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The prohibition against retaliatory eviction, however, was not uniformly
accepted by New York courts. Some lower courts accepted the retaliatory
eviction defense when landlords commenced summary proceedings to evict
holdover tenants,' 5 and some localities adopted local ordinances against the
practice. ' 6 In many areas of New York State, however, tenants were without
any protection from retaliation.' 7 Moreover, even where the retaliatory
eviction doctrine was applied, there was confusion and dispute with regard to
the existence of defenses to retaliation, ' 8 and the availability of a damage cause
of action' 9 and injunctive relief. 20 Hence, a more comprehensive approach
506 (footnotes omitted). See also Toms Point Apts. v. Goudzward, 72 Misc. 2d 629, 339
N.Y.S.2d 281 (Nassau County Dist. Ct. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 79 Misc. 2d 206, 360 N.Y.S.2d
366 (App. Term 2d Dep't 1973). The court stated that these first amendment rights "would for all
practical purposes be meaningless if the threat of eviction would coerce the most justifiable
complaints into a submissive silence." Id. at 632, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 286.
A third rationale, discussed in dicta, concerns the citizen's right to inform his government of a
violation of law. "The right of a citizen informing of a violation of law, like the right of a prisoner
in custody upon a charge of such violation, to be protected against lawless violence, does not
depend upon any of the Amendments to the Constitution, but arises out of the creation and
establishment by the Constitution itself of a national government, paramount and supreme within
its sphere of action." Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1016 (1969), (quoting In re Quarles & Butler, 158 U.S. 532, 536 (1895)).
The growth of the retaliatory eviction prohibition primarily involved residential rental housing.
It has not gained a comparable degree of acceptance by courts or legislatures in the commercial
rental context. This is due to the lack of significant public policy, i.e., improving housing, sec
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfeld, 48 A.D.2d 428, 432-33, 370 N.Y.S.2d 943, 948-49 (2d Dep't
1975), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 936, 358 N.E.2d 882, 390 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1976), and the availability of
other remedies. See William C. Cornitius, Inc. v. Wheeler, 276 Or. 747, 755-56, 556 P.2d 666,
670-71 (1976) (en banc). In a recent Hawaii case, however, a commercial tenant was permitted to
use a retaliatory eviction defense. Windward Partners v. Delos Santos, 59 Hawaii 104, 117, 577
P.2d 326, 334 (1978).
15. E.g., Toms Point Apts. v. Goudzward, 72 Misc. 2d 629, 632, 339 N.Y.S.2d 281, 286
(Nassau County Dist. Ct. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 79 Misc 2d 206, 360 N.Y.S.2d 366 (App.
Term. 2d Dep't 1973); Markese v. Cooper, 70 Misc. 2d 78, 486-87, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63, 72-73
(Monroe County Ct. 1972); 401 Boardwalk Corp. v. Gutzwiller, 82 Misc. 2d 84, 86-87, 368
N.Y.S.2d 122, 125-26 (Long Beach City Ct. 1975); Portnoy v. Hill, 57 Misc. 2d 1097, 1100, 294
N.Y.S.2d 278, 279-81 (Binghamton City Ct. 1968). But see Lincoln Square Apts., Inc. v. Davis,
58 Misc. 2d 292, 294, 295 N.Y.S.2d 358, 361 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 64 Misc, 2d 859, 316
N.Y.S.2d 130 (App. Term. Ist Dep't 1969) (the court rejected a defense of retaliation in summary
proceedings).
16. In 1972, Syracuse and Binghamton passed local laws prohibiting retaliatory eviction of
tenants. N.Y. State Senator Pisani, Questions & Answers About the Anti-Retaliation Housing
Bill at 2 (undated) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Questions &
Answers]; see Cornell v. Dimmick, 73 Misc. 2d 384, 387-88, 342 N.Y.S.2d 275, 279 (Binghamton
City Ct. 1973) (court applied the Binghamton ordinance).
17. Questions & Answers, supra note 16, at 1.
18. See Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Lincoln
Square Apts., Inc. v. Davis, 58 Misc. 2d 292, 294, 295 N.Y.S.2d 358, 361 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1968),
aff'd, 64 Misc. 2d 859, 316 N.Y.S.2d 130 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1969); Church v. Allen Meadows
Apts., 69 Misc. 2d 254, 255-56, 329 N.Y.S.2d 148, 150 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
19. Compare Markese v. Cooper, 70 Misc. 2d 478, 489, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63, 75 (Monroe County
Ct. 1972) (damages recoverable) with 401 Boardwalk Corp. v. Gutzwiller, 82 Misc. 2d 84, 87,
368 N.Y.S.2d 122, 125 (Long Beach City Ct. 1975) (rejecting a damage cause of action).
20. Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The court held that
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was needed to solve effectively the problem of retaliatory eviction on a
statewide basis. As one court lamented, "unless the Legislature acts, these
admittedly incomplete standards will have to suffice until the slow hand of
experience shapes new and better ones." 2'
B. The Basic Elements of Section 223-b
Against this background, New York joined the growing number of juris-
dictions that have enacted legislation against retaliatory eviction. 2 Section
223-b is intended to become "a key ingredient which has been missing" in
New York's housing program. 23 The statute makes available to tenants an
injunctive relief was not available to prevent an eviction because the availability of a retaliatory
eviction defense in New York courts would be sufficient protection. Id. at 507; see Church v.
Allen Meadows Apts., 69 Misc. 2d 254, 255, 329 N.Y.S.2d 148, 150 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
21. Markese v. Cooper, 70 Misc. 2d 478, 490, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63. 75 (Monroe County Ct.
1972). See also 401 Boardwalk Corp. v. Gutzwiller, 82 Misc. 2d 84, 87. 368 N.Y S.2d 122,
125-26 (Long Beach City Ct. 1975).
22. E.g., Alaska Stat. § 34.03.310 (Cum. Supp. 1975); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann, § 33-1491 tWest
Supp. 1979); Cal. Civ. Code § 1942.5 (West Supp. 1980); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 47a-20 tWest
Supp. 1980); Del. Code Ann. tit. 25, § 5516 (1975); D.C. Code Encycl. § 45-1654 (West
1978); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 521-74 (1976); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 80, § 71 (Smith-Hurd 1966); Ky. Rev.
Stat. § 383.705 (Supp. 1978); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 6001 (1980); Md. Real Prop. Code
Ann. § 8-208.1 (Supp. 1979); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 186, § 18 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1980);
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.5720 (West Supp. 1979); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 566.03 tWest Supp.
1979); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-1439 (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 540:13-a, -b (Supp.
1979); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:42-10.10 (West Supp. 1979); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5321.02
(Anderson Supp. 1979); Or. Rev. Stat. § 91.865 (1977); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Purdon
1977); R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-20-10 (1970); Va. Code § 55-248.39 (Supp. 1979); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. §§ 59.18.240, 59.18.250 (Supp. 1978).
23. N.Y. State Senator Pisani Press Release at 1 (May 8, 1979) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review). The law is intended to " 'preserve and upgrade the quality of [New York's) existing
housing.' " Id. Senator Pisani also stated that tenants' housing rights " 'are usele-s unless tenants
may responsibly exercise them without fear. [Section 223-b] will enable them to do so.' " News
From Senator Joseph R. Pisani (June 15, 1979) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). There
had been unsuccessful attempts to enact such legislation in every year since 1972. Section 223-b
represents the culmination of these efforts. Questions & Answers, supra note 16, at 3. Municipal-
ities could not effectively deal with the problem of retaliatory eviction, because the state
government has exclusive jurisdiction concerning major changes in landlord-tenant law. Id.
There was near-unanimous approval of the bill in the New York Senate, with only one Senator
publicly opposed. Id.
The law is applicable to "all rental residential premises except owned-occupied dwellings with
less than four units." N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b(6) (McKinney 1979). The law is primarily
intended to govern premises not subject to rent regulation because these already have ev-iction
controls more restrictive than those of § 223-b. Questions & Answers, supra note 16, at 2. See
also Mullarkey v. Borglum, 323 F. Supp. 1218, 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (the court observed that
"evictions from rent-controlled premises in New York City are well nigh impossible because they
are strictly limited and may be obtained only upon the landlord's proving one of the grounds
enumerated in the applicable law."). Therefore, § 223-b will have its major impact in upstate
areas of New York and suburban low-income rental housing. Within New York City, § 223-b
will principally affect rental housing not governed by rent regulation, including converted lofts in
Manhattan and converted one, two, and three family homes in other boroughs of the city, which
were previously owner-occupied. Questions & Answers, supra note 16, at 2. The provisions of the
1980]
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affirmative defense of retaliation, 24 sets forth a procedure for courts to follow
in determining the existence of landlord retaliation, 25 provides for injunctive
relief, 26 and establishes a damage cause of action.
27
Prior to the enactment of section 223-b, some New York courts accepted an
equitable defense of retaliatory eviction. 28 In this respect, the statute codifies
this prior law. Thus, when a landlord brings a summary proceeding for
possession, a tenant may plead the defense. 29 Section 223-b, however, goes
beyond the common law and affirmatively gives tenants a cause of action for
damages 30 and allows them to sue for injunctive relief. 3 1
law are not applicable "in any case in which it is established that the condition from which tile
complaint or action arose was caused by the tenant, a member of the tenant's household, or a
guest of the tenant" or "where a tenancy was terminated pursuant to the terms of a lease as a
result of a bona fide transfer of ownership." N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b(6) (McKinney Supp.
1979).
24. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b(4) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
25. Id. § 223-b(4)(5).
26. Id. § 223-b(3).
27. Id.
28. Toms Point Apts. v. Goudzward, 72 Misc. 2d 629, 632, 339 N.Y.S.2d 281, 286 (Nassau
County Dist. Ct. 1972, aff'd per curiam, 79 Misc. 2d 206, 360 N.Y.S.2d 366 (App. Term 2d
Dep't 1973); Markese v. Cooper, 70 Misc. 2d 478, 487, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63, 73 (Monroe County Ct.
1972); 401 Boardwalk Corp. v. Gutzwiller, 82 Misc. 2d 84, 85, 368 N.Y.S.2d 122, 124 (Long
Beach City Ct. 1975); Portnoy v. Hill, 57 Misc. 2d 1097, 1100, 294 N.Y.S,2d 278, 281
(Binghamton City Ct. 1968). This equitable defense of retaliatory eviction, fashioned by courts,
rested on § 743 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law, which states that "any legal or
equitable defense" may be asserted by a tenant in an eviction proceeding. N.Y. Real Prop. Acts.
Law § 743 (McKinney 1979). Accordingly, courts concluded that they had the inherent power "to
accommodate any equitable defense, including retaliatory eviction." Markese v. Cooper, 70 Misc.
2d 478, 487, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63, 73 (Monroe Country Ct. 1972).
29. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b(4) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
30. Id. § 223-b(3); see pt. III infra.
31. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b(3) (McKinney Supp. 1979). The change in New York law
with respect to injunctive relief is illustrated by the following case. In Church v. Allen Meadows
Apts., 69 Misc. 2d 254, 329 N.Y.S.2d 148 (Sup. Ct. 1972), a pre-§ 223-b case, tenants received a
notice to quit which they believed to have been served in retaliation. They petitioned the court for
an injunction prohibiting the landlord from acting on the notice before he commenced a summary
proceeding for possession. Id. at 255, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 149. Although the court was convinced
that the landlord had acted in retaliation for the tenants' participation in a tenants' organization,
id., it refused to grant injunctive relief, reasoning that the availability of an equitable defense in
an eventual proceeding was sufficient retaliatory protection. Id. at 255-56, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
Under § 223-b, however, a tenant who receives a notice to quit can now request a court to issue
an injunction similar to that sought in Church. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b(3) (McKlnney
Supp. 1979). For a preliminary injunction to issue in New York, a strong showing must be made
by the tenant that there is a probability of success on the merits, irreparable harm if the relief is
not granted, and that a balancing of equities is in his favor. Gambar Enterprises, Inc. v. Kelly
Servs., 69 A.D.2d 297, 306, 418 N.Y.S.2d 818, 824 (4th Dep't 1979). For the Second Circuit
standard, see Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assoc., 483 F.2d 247, 250 (2d Cir. 1973)
(the issuance of a preliminary injunction requires likelihood of success on merits and possible
irreparable harm or serious questions on the merits which make them a proper basis for litigation
and a balance of hardships clearly on the side of the party requesting the relief). Accord, Selchow
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Under section 223-b a tenant is specifically protected against retaliatory
eviction if he files good faith complaints with governmental authorities,
3 -
exercises his rights under the rental agreement or any housing law,3 3 or
& Righter Co. v. McGraw-Hill Book Co., 580 F.2d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1978); Missouri Portland
Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 L'.S 883 (1974).
A tenant can also seek injunctive relief to prevent other forms of retaliation, such as when he
receives a demand for a disproportionate rent increase after he has engaged in protected
activities. If the court decides that injunctive relief should not be granted or the tenant does not
seek an injunction, the rent increase will take effect. If the tenant pays only the agreed-upon rent,
the landlord may not bring a summary proceeding based on nonpayment of the new rent. Rather,
the landlord must bring holdover summary proceedings if he desires the tenant's removal. See
note 45 infra. At this point, the tenant can assert the defense of retaliation, and the resolution of
the issue will determine whether the additional rent is to be paid. Section 223-b appears to require
that the tenant pay the original rent, that is, the "rent for which he is otherwise liable," but not
the additional portion demanded in order to avail himself of the retaliatory defense. N Y. Real
Prop. Law § 223-b(4) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
32. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1979). Many cases have involved
tenants who, in attempting to secure housing rights, made complaints to authorities and shortly
thereafter were the object of landlord retaliation. E.g., Edwards v. Habib. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969); Portnoy v. Hill, 57 Misc. 2d 1097, 294 N Y.S.2d
278 (Binghamton City Ct. 1968); Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 1970)
To avail himself of the benefits of § 223-b, a tenant who reports violations to housing
authorities must show that he acted in good faith. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-billtal (McKinney
Supp. 1979). Thus, he should be required to demonstrate that he dealt fairly with the landlord.
He should submit evidence that the condition complained of existed and was serious in nature,
and that the complaint was reasonable. Toms Point Apts. v. Goudzward. 72 Misc 2d 629,
632-33, 339 N.Y.S.2d 281, 286 (Nassau County Dist. Ct. 1972). aff'd per curiam, 79 Misc.
2d 206,360 N.Y.S.2d 366 (App. Term 2d Dep't 1973). In addition, the tenant must present proof
that he did not cause the condition. See N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b16) (McKinney Supp. 1979)
The statute, however, does not mandate that the condition be present at the time of the litigation.
Such a requirement had been established by the trial court in Toms Point. 72 Misc. 2d at 633, 339
N.Y.S.2d at 286. In affirming the holding of the trial court, the Supreme Court. Appellate Term.
disagreed on this point. 79 Misc. 2d at 206, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 367. The New York legislature
wisely rejected this requirement. Under such a test, a landlord could evade the retaliatory
eviction prohibition quite easily, by simply repairing the condition which prompted the complaint
and then initiating the proceeding for possession. Thus, although the condition complained of is
remedied, the tenant will not be in possession to benefit therefrom. A consideration of these
factors will act as a safeguard against unfounded complaints by tenants who are merely trying to
abuse § 223-b.
The New York City Housing Authority opposed the passage of § 223-b because it believed
that tenants would subvert the purpose of the law by making "baseles complaint[s]" in order to
take advantage of the law's protections. The Authority feared that tenants would thereby employ
retaliatory eviction "as a standard defense in all summary proceedings." Letter from New York
City Housing Authority to Richard A. Brown, Counsel to Gov. Carey (July 12. 1979) ton file with
the Fordhan Law Review).
33. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 19791. Retaliatory eviction often
occurs after a tenant asserts that the premises are uninhabitable as a defense to an action for
nonpayment of rent, see, e.g., Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F 2d 853 (D.C. Cir
1972), or after the tenant complains to the landlord about conditions in need of repair, see, e.g.,
Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 510. 476 P.2d 97, 98, 90 Cal Rptr. 729. 730 1970)1
Aweeka v. Bonds, 20 Cal. App. 3d 278, 281. 97 Cal. Rptr. 650. 651-52 (1971) Landlords have
also retaliated against tenants who have sought to secure or prevent zoning changes. See, e.g.,
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participates in a tenants' organization.3 4 The statute specifically prohibits a
landlord from either serving a notice to quit 3 S or commencing a summary
proceeding to recover possession 36 in retaliation to protected tenant activities.
In addition, a landlord may not substantially alter the terms of a tenancy in
retaliation. 37
The law states that "[s]ubstantial alteration shall include, but is not limited
to" refusing to continue a tenancy, offer a new lease, or renew the lease. 38
The flexibility of this provision will be extremely valuable to courts in
deciding whether a landlord's conduct was in fact retaliatory. Disproportion-
ate rent increases, for example, have been expressly decreed by some legisla-
tures to be retaliatory. 3 9 It might be argued, therefore, that because the New
Windward Partners v. Delos Santos, 59 Hawaii 104, 105-07, 577 P.2d 326, 328(1978); Pohlman v.
Metropolitan Trailer Park, Inc., 126 N.J. Super. 114, 117. 312 A.2d 888, 889 (Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1973).
Under § 223-b, a complaint made by a tenant to the landlord in reference to a housing code
violation or a breach of the Warranty of Habitability Statute, N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 235-b
(McKinney Supp. 1979), for example, would be considered a protected act. This result is
desirable because the successful operation of important housing legislation would be impaired if
tenant notification of a landlord were denied retaliatory protection.
The legislative history indicates that one of the primary purposes behind the enactment of §
223-b was to aid the operation of the Warranty of Habitability Statute. See N.Y. State Senator
Pisani, Memorandum in Support ofS. 4138-A [§ 223-b] (undated) (on file with the Fordhiam Law
Review) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum in Support]; Questions & Answers, supra note 16, at
1. See also Governor Hugh Carey, Memorandum in Approval of the Retaliatory Eviction Law,
reprinted in McKinney's Session Law News (Aug. 1979) at A-438 (July 13, 1979). Governor Carey
stated: "[tlhis legislation is intended to prevent landlords from threatening tenants with eviction
for complaining of violations thereby remaining immune from compliance with housing codes and
the New York State Warranty of Habitability Statute enacted in 1975." Id. The use of the
warranty is a protected act when the tenant makes a habitability complaint and also when the
tenant has used it in a court action. In many New York cases, for example, tenants have
withheld rental payments and have successfully asserted breach of the Warranty of Habitability
in a non-payment proceeding brought by the landlord. See, e.g., Ocean Rock Assocs. v. Cruz, 66
A.D.2d 878, 878, 411 N.Y.S.2d 663, 664 (2d Dep't 1978); Goldner v. Doknovitch, 88 Misc. 2d
88, 89-90, 388 N.Y.S.2d 504, 505-06 (App. Term. Ist Dep't 1976); Kipsborough Realty Corp. v.
Goldbetter, 81 Misc. 2d 1054, 1057, 367 N.Y.S.2d 916, 920 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1975) (applying an
implied warranty of habitability prior to the enactment of RPL § 235-b). These habitability
protections would be meaningless, however, if the landlord could retaliate shortly thereafter by
terminating the tenancy at the end of the rental period.
34. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b(1)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1979). A large number of
retaliation cases have involved tenants who were members of tenants' associations. E.g., Davis v.
Village Park II Realty Co., 578 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1978); E. & E. Newman, Inc. v. Hallock, 116
N.J. Super. 220, 281 A.2d 544 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971); Toms Point Apts. v. Goudzward, 72
Misc. 2d 629, 339 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Nassau County Dist. Ct. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 79 Misc. 2d
206, 360 N.Y.S.2d 366 (App. Term 2d Dep't 1973). "A tenant's constitutional rights to petition
government for redress of grievances and to freedom of association [will] receive practical
protection" under § 223-b. Memorandum in Support, supra note 33, at 1.
35. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b(1) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
36. Id.
37. Id. § 223-b(2).
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 25, § 5516 (a)(2) (1975); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 383.705(1) (Supp.
1978); Va. Code § 55-248.39(a) (Supp. 1979); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 59.18.240 (2) (Supp. 1978).
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York legislature did not specifically mention them in section 223-b, it did not
intend to prohibit retaliatory rent increases. Legislation with language similar
to that of section 223-b, however, has been interpreted as including such
conduct in its prohibition. The New Jersey statute, 40 for example, specifically
makes unlawful a substantial alteration of the terms of a tenancy in retalia-
tion.4! The New Jersey Superior Court, 42 interpreting this law, held that a
rent increase from $70 to $200 was a prohibited act within the meaning of the
statute.
43
An unreasonable increase in rent can have the same effect as an actual
eviction proceeding by forcing a tenant to vacate the premises.44 Such an
increase punishes tenants for engaging in protected activities and thus deters
these activities. Accordingly, New York courts should regard retaliatory rent
increases as prohibited landlord conduct within section 223-b.4 -
Landlords might also retaliate by reducing services. This practice also
penalizes and deters tenants and therefore should be considered prohibited
landlord conduct under section 223-b. Other states have legislated against
it.46 In New York, however, the need for protection in this context is less
urgent because any reduction in services serious enough to be regarded as a
substantial alteration of the terms of a tenancy is probably a breach of the
Warranty of Habitability Statute, 47 which will adequately protect the tenant
40. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:42-10.10 (West Supp. 1979).
41. Id. § 2A:42-10.10.
42. E. & E. Newman, Inc. v. Hallock, 116 N.J. Super. 220, 281 A.2d 544 (Super. CL App.
Div. 1971).
43. Id. at 222-23, 281 A.2d at 546.
44. The tenant's removal from the premises following a retaliatory rent increase is usually the
result of a court order obtained on a theory of nonpayment. See Aweeka v. Bonds, 20 Cal. App
3d 278, 97 Cal. Rptr. 650 (Ct. App. 1971); E. & E. Newman, Inc. v. Hallock, 116 N.J Super
220, 281 A.2d 544 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 19711.
45. A strict interpretation of § 223-b would not, however, leave tenants defenseless to
retaliatory rent increases. Although a tenant who decides to pay the increase as demanded will
not be able to assert a claim of retaliation, one who merely continues tendering the original rental
charge will have statutory protection. It has been held that a landlord may not bring a
nonpayment proceeding based on a tenant's refusal to pay a rent increase. E.g., Palagonia v
Pappas, 79 Misc. 2d 830, 831, 361 N.Y.S.2d 236, 237 (Suffolk County Ct. 1974) (rent increase
following expiration of a tenancy for a definite term); Industrial Funding Corp. v. Megna, 87
Misc. 2d 443, 449, 384 N.Y.S.2d 955, 960 (Buffalo City Ct. 1976) (rent increase following
termination of a periodic tenancy). Rather, a landlord must evict the tenant through a normal
holdover summary proceeding to recover possession. E.g., Palagonia v. Pappas, 79 Misc. 2d at
831, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 237; Industrial Funding Corp. v. Megna, 87 Misc. 2d at 449, 384 N.Y.S.2d
at 960. Because such a holdover proceeding for possession falls specifically within § 223-b's
proscription, N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b(1l) (McKinney Supp. 1979), a tenant can then assert
the defense of retaliation. Id. § 223-b(4).
46. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 47a-20 (West Supp. 1980); Md. Real Prop. Code Ann.
§ 8-208.1(2) (Supp. 1979); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5321.02 (Anderson Supp. 1979); Wash. Rev
Code Ann. § 59.18.240(3) (Supp. 1978).
47. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1979). The pertinent part of the statute
reads: "In every written or oral lease or rental agreement for residential premises the landlord or
lessor shall be deemed to covenant and warrant that the premises so leased or rented . . are fit
for human habitation and for the uses reasonably intended by the parties and that the occupants
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whether or not this conduct is made unlawful under section 223-b. 48
II. PROOF
The nature of the proof required to show retaliation under section 223-b is
yet to be determined. Although the statute sets forth a clear procedure for the
resolution of the issue when the landlord sues,4 9 it is less clear on the standard
applicable when the tenant uses retaliatory eviction as a basis for his own
action. It is contended that the standard to be used should be the same in both
situations.
Section 223-b provides that, in an action by the landlord to recover
possession, the tenant will prevail if the court finds, first, that the landlord
retaliated for a protected tenant act and, second, that he "would not otherwise
have" commenced the action.5 0 The tenant will bear the burden of proof on
both these issues.51 It will be relatively easy for him to meet the first proof
requirement. The tenant need only show that he engaged in protected acts
and that the landlord subsequently brought the action.5 2
Retaliatory motive, the second evidentiary element, will be the crucial and
problematic issue in cases arising under section 223-b. The tenant must show
that, but for his protected activities, the landlord would not have instituted
the possessory proceeding.5 3 New York courts, prior to the enactment of
section 223-b, had addressed the problem of proving retaliatory motive. One
court5 4 established a multi-step approach which mandated, inter alia, that the
"overriding reason" behind the landlord's conduct be retaliation for the
tenant's exercise of constitutional rights."5 Another5 6 declared that a tenant
must prove "by clear and convincing evidence" the presence of a retaliatory
motive.5 7 These approaches are conclusory, however, in that they do not
provide meaningful guidelines which other courts can apply in determining a
landlord's motive; specific criteria are needed.
of such premises shall not be subjected to any conditions which would be dangerous, hazardous
or detrimental to their life, health or safety." Id. § 235-b(1).
48. The statute gives tenants a cause of action for breach of warranty. Id. § 235-b(3); see,
e.g., Park West Management Corp. v. Mitchell, 47 N.Y.2d 316, 330, 418 N.Y.S.2d 310, 317, 391
N.E.2d 1288, 1295 (1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3387 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1979) (No. 79-553);
Ocean Rock Assocs. v. Cruz, 66 A.D.2d 878, 879, 411 N.Y.S.2d 663, 664 (2d Dep't 1978);
Goodman v. Ramirez, 100 Misc. 2d 881, 887-89, 420 N.Y.S.2d 185, 189-90 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1979).
49. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b(4)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
50. Id. § 223-b(4).
51. A party asserting an affirmative defense bears the burden of proving that issue. Conner v.
Keese, 105 N.Y. 643, 646, 11 N.E. 516, 518 (1887).
52. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b(4) (McKinney Supp. 1979). The tenant must also show that
he acted in good faith. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
53. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b(4) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
54. Toms Point Apts. v. Goudzward, 72 Misc. 2d 629, 339 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Nassau County
Dist. Ct. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 79 Misc. 2d 206, 360 N.Y.S.2d 366 (App. Term 2d Dep't 1973).
55. Id. at 633, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 286.
56. 401 Boardwalk Corp. v. Gutzwiller, 82 Misc. 2d 84. 368 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Long Beach City
Ct. 1975).
57. Id. at 85, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 124; see Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 399, 173 N.W.2d
297, 302 (1970).
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There are basic considerations that can be objectively measured by courts.
For instance, strong evidence of retaliatory motive is that the actor had
knowledge of something against which he retaliated. Therefore, the tenant
should be required to prove that the landlord knew of the protected tenant
activity 8 before he acted. Thus, if a landlord served a notice to quit before
the tenant made a complaint or engaged in some other protected act, a
nonretaliatory motive should be inferred. 59 In addition, a disparity in treat-
ment of tenants can be indicative of unlawful motive. The court should
determine whether the landlord treated this tenant in a manner significantly
different from others similarly situated. For example, in one case, 60 the tenant
made a complaint and subsequently received a large rent increase. The court
stated that such an increase, "when viewed in relation to the lack of rent
increases among other tenants, is a strong indication" of retaliatory motive.
6
'
If a landlord claims that he has acted in response to a tenant's alleged mis-
behavior rather than his protected activities, the court should examine the
landlord's response to similar misbehavior of other tenants.
Ultimately, the lawfulness of the landlord's motive will be a difficult
question for the trier of fact.62 It will also pose a heavy burden on the tenant
because his landlord will be the "best possible source of information '63 and
the tenant will have difficulties in obtaining evidence indicating unlawful
motive. The New York legislature, recognizing this problem, 64  provided
tenants with some assistance in proving unlawful motive. Section 223-b
establishes that when a landlord brings an action or proceeding for possession,
a rebuttable presumption of retaliation will arise if the tenant can show that
the landlord commenced the possessory action, served a notice to quit, or
58. Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 399, 173 N.W.2d 297, 302 11970)-
59. See N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b(1) (McKinney Supp. 1979); cf. Conn. Gen. Stat- Ann.
§ 47a-20(b)(4) (West 1978 & Supp. 1980) (when a landlord serves a notice to quit before the
tenant's complaint, his possessory action will succeed).
60. E. & E. Newman, Inc. v. Hallock, 116 N.J. Super. 220, 281 A.2d 544 (Super- Ct. App
Div. 1971).
61. Id. at 225, 281 A.2d at 546. See also Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 510,
476 P.2d 97, 98, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729, 730 (1970) (en banc). Courts have also found this test useful in
the context of labor relations. In Berbiglia, Inc. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d 839 (8th Cir. 1979), the court
was presented with the discharge of two union employees, allegedly because of misconduct. There
was evidence that they, along with a non-union employee, had falsified commission reports.
While the latter was promoted, the two union employees were dismissed. Id. at 842. In
concluding that the dismissals were unlawfully motivated, the court stated that the "key factor"
was "the entirely different treatment accorded.., the anti-union sales clerk, as compared to that
given [the discharged union members]." Id. at 844. In resolving claims of retaliatory eviction,
courts have found principles of labor relations to be useful. See, e.g., Davis v. Village Park I
Realty Co., 578 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1978); Robinson v. Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d
853, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 699 n.38 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969); Markese v. Cooper, 70 Misc. 2d 478, 488-89, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63, 74
(Monroe County Ct. 1972); Sims v. Century Kiest Apts., 567 S.W.2d 526, 530 (Tex. Civ. App,
1978).
62. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 702 (D.C. Cir. 19681, cert denied, 393 L-S. 1016
(1969).
63. Memorandum in Support, supra note 33, at 1.
64. Id.
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attempted to alter substantially the terms of the tenancy within six months of
certain specially protected acts.
65
The importance of the presumption is that it changes the proof procedure.
In a typical situation a holdover month-to-month tenant makes a complaint to
a housing authority, and within the next six months he receives a notice to
quit. 66 If in the resulting summary proceeding the tenant asserts the
affirmative defense of retaliatory eviction, the presumption would arise. 67 In
order to rebut it, the landlord must "provide a credible explanation of a
non-retaliatory motive for his acts."'68 It appears that the explanation requires
a showing of no more than "that [the landlord] wants the tenant out for any
reason other than to retaliate. '69 More importantly, the landlord need not
point to tenant misbehavior or other good cause. Under section 223-b any
reason other than retaliation will serve to rebut the presumption. 70 If the
65. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b(S) (McKinney Supp. 1979). Specially protected tenant
activities which trigger the presumption of retaliation include a good faith complaint to a
governmental authority, an action in a court or official agency wherein the tenant has attempted
to enforce housing rights; a judgment in the tenant's favor in a previous court action between the
parties, or an order, an inspection, or some other action taken as a result of a governmental
complaint or attempted enforcement of housing rights in a court or administrative body. Id.
§ 223-b(5)(aXbXc). The statute provides that, even when the action or proceeding was begun more
than six months later, as long as the notice to quit was served within the period, the presumption
will be relevant at the time of the litigation. Id. § 223-b(5). By the express terms of § 223-b, the
presumption is applicable in a proceeding or action for possession brought by a landlord. Id. The
statute does not, however, indicate whether the presumption can arise in an action brought by the
tenant. Id.
The presumption does not apply in several instances. The first is where the tenant is in
violation of the terms of the rental agreement, which includes "nonpayment of the agreed-upon
rent." Second, being a member of a tenants' association, by itself, is not enough to entitle a tenant
to the presumption. In addition, the tenant must have made a governmental complaint or taken
part in a prior court action, or, the tenants' group must have made a complaint on this tenant's
behalf. Third, if the tenant merely informs the landlord of a grievance, the presumption will not
arise; rather, the tenant is required to have made a complaint to the government or taken part in
a court action involving a dispute with the landlord in orler to benefit from the presumption
within the next six months. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b(5) (McKinney Supp. 1979). Thus,
while § 223-b evidences a legislative grant of basic retaliatory protection for being a member of a
tenants' group and making complaints to a landlord, these are not within the category of specially
protected acts benefiting from the statutory presumption.
66. In an analogous situation, a tenant with a one-year lease might establish that he made a
governmental complaint and, within the next six months, the landlord notified him that the lease
would not be renewed.
67. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b(5) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
68. Id. Rather than shifting the burden of proof, this places on a landlord a "more limited
'burden of going forward' " with an explanation. Memorandum in Support, supra note 33, at 1.
69. Memorandum in Support, supra note 33, at 1.
70. If, however, the landlord merely restates the grounds for bringing the proceeding for
possession, without further explanation, it may not be enough to rebut the presumption of
retaliation. The Committee on Landlord and Tenant of the New York State Bar Association, in
opposing the enactment of § 223-b, expressed the fear that such a mere restatement of the
grounds for removal would be sufficient rebuttal. The Committee on Landlord and Tenant of the
Real Property Law Section of the New York State Bar Association, Legislation Report No. 149
(1979) (attached to Letter from Kent H. Brown, Legislative Counsel, to Richard A. Brown,
Counsel to Gov. Carey (June 21, 1979)) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
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landlord meets this burden, the tenant must then bear the burden of
disproving the explanation "by a preponderance of the evidence."'I
This procedure is an equitable one. If a more restrictive procedure were
used to discourage retaliatory conduct by landlords, it would be extremely
difficult for them to evict tenants at the end of a rental period once the issue of
retaliation had been raised. 72 Such a result would closely resemble the
eviction controls commonly found in rent control statutes, which protect the
tenant by severely limiting the amount of control that a landlord may exercise
over his property. 73 The result would be a significant alteration of the purpose
of the retaliatory eviction prohibition.7 4 Section 223-b was intended to dis-
courage landlord retaliation, 7 5 not to be the foundation for widespread judi-
71. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-bt5) (McKinney Supp. 1979)
72. Under the present law of Minnesota, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 566 03 (West Supp 1979), for
example, in most cases the landlord must establish that he was not motivated "in whole or in
part" by a desire to retaliate. Id. In Parkin v. Fitzgerald, 307 Minn. 423, 240 N W 2d 828 (1976),
this statutory requirement was interpreted to mean that the landlord must prove a nonretaliatory
reason, which is "a reason wholly unrelated to and unmotivated by" protected tenant activities.
Id. at 430, 240 N.W.2d at 832. This was held to be "nonpayment of rent, other material breach
of covenant, continuing damage to premises by tenants, or removal of [the] housing unit from
[the] market for a sound business reason." Id. at 430, 240 N.W.2d at 832-33. The court then
observed that "[sluch a standard will give full protection to tenants " Id. at 430-31, 240 N W.2d
at 833. Full protection from eviction, however, is not the purpose of the retaliatory eviction
prohibition. Rather, the prohibition is designed to prevent eviction in those specific cases in which
the landlord has retaliated. This should not require a landlord to prove good cause, such as
tenant misconduct, or the desire to remove the unit from the market In New Jersey, the statutory
presumption, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A: 42-10.12 (West Supp. 1979), has been held to mean that
when a landlord, in arriving at a decision to evict, takes into account a protected tenant act "the
notice to quit is a 'reprisal' ...although other factors may also be present or even dominant."
Silberg v. Lipscomb, 117 N.J. Super. 491, 496, 285 A 2d 86, 88 (Union County Ct. 1971)
(emphasis added).
73. Under the New York State Rent Control law, for example, if the tenant is not in violation
of an obligation of the tenancy, is not committing a nuisance, damaging the premises, using the
premises for an illegal purpose, or has not unreasonably denied the landlord access to the
premises, he cannot be removed unless the landlord obtains a certificate of eviction from the
housing commission. N.Y. State Rent Control, Unconsol Laws § 8585(1)-2) (McKinney 1974) A
certificate of eviction will only be issued if the landlord establishes good cause that he needs
the premises for personal or immediate family use, or intends to remodel or demolish them. Id.
Thus, whether or not the tenant has a lease, he is assured considerable housing security This
security is predicated on the legislative finding that "a serious public emergency continues to exist
in the housing of a considerable number of persons in the state of New York. Id- § 8581(1). In
other words, areas of the state that have rent and eviction controls have been granted special
treatment. The areas of the state in which § 223-b is to have its primary effect, however, have not
been designated by the legislature as areas that deserve such stringent eviction controls.
Therefore, § 223-b should not be interpreted to deny indirectly to landlords control over their
premises which the legislature did not see fit to do.
An argument might be made that all tenancies in New York State should be granted
substantial eviction controls. Tenants would certainly support such a measure This issue may be
faced by the legislature in coming years. It is not, however, a proper concern in the discussion of
§ 223-b.
74. See notes 8-14 supra and accompanying text.
75. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
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cially decreed extensions of tenancies. Accordingly, the probative approach
embodied in section 223-b represents a well-conceived basis for courts to deal
with the problem of retaliatory eviction in that it is neither exceedingly
pro-tenant nor pro-landlord.
The section 223-b standard is a not-for-bad-cause eviction standard7 6 rather
than a good cause standard. It recognizes that a landlord will rarely have a
motive that can be characterized as 100% nonretaliatory and that the
holdover tenant will have engaged in some sort of protected activity prior to
the eviction proceeding. It prevents a tenant from being placed in a more
secure position merely because he engaged in protected activities prior to the
landlord's conduct77 but nevertheless gives those activities the respect they
must be accorded. The tenant is protected from retaliation, but the landlord
retains adequate control over his property. Thus, in the case of a tenant's
affirmative cause of action, the standard of proof should not be less than that
used when he raises the retaliatory issue defensively.78 As a practical matter,
the educated tenant or his attorney, who is aware that the presumption will
not be available in this situation, will simply wait for the landlord to bring a
possessory suit, assert the affirmative defense, and consequently receive the
benefit of the presumption. In any event, the comprehensiveness of the
procedure and standard of proof set forth in section 223-b should lead courts
to utilize this basic standard, applying the presumption regardless of how the
issue of retaliation has been raised.
III. REMEDIES FOR RETALIATORY EVICTION
A. Preventive Relief
Once retaliation is successfully proven, 79 the court must determine how
long the tenant can continue in possession. Section 223-b simply states that a
landlord cannot be obligated to extend the tenancy for more than one year, 80
76. This more accurately reflects the intent behind the retaliatory eviction prohibition, which
is not "based on the tenant's right to possession, per se, but rather seeks to deny possession to the
landlord because of his tainted motive in evicting the tenant." Markese v. Cooper, 70 Misc. 2d
478, 480, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63, 66 (Monroe County Ct. 1972). It is a negative standard, rather than
one which requires cause, i.e., a showing of tenant misconduct. Compare the Minnesota standard
described in note 72 supra.
77. This consideration was enunciated by the Supreme Court in a labor relations retaliation
case. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). The employee
was an untenured teacher who was dismissed one month after he informed a local radio station of
a new school policy. He claimed that this exercise of first amendment rights was the reason
behind the board's decision not to rehire him. This teacher, however, had previously engaged in
other misbehavior which included making obscence gestures to students. The Court was careful
not to place the employee "in a better position as a result of the exercise of constitutionally
protected conduct than he would have occupied had he done nothing." Id. at 285. The important
consideration was to ensure that the employee was "placed in no worse a position than if he had
not engaged in the conduct." Id. at 285-86.
78. In addition, when an injunction is sought, a considerable showing of future unlawful
conduct must be made. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
79. See pt. II supra.
80. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b(2) (McKinney Supp. 1979). "[A] landlord shall not be
required under this section to offer a new lease or a lease renewal for a term greater than one year
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but does not establish any other guidelines. In the case of a tenant with a lease
of one year or more, the statute is clear-the court can grant injunctive relief
for, at most, one year.8 '
There is less statutory direction for courts with regard to the relief that
should be made available to periodic tenants following a decision in their
favor. For example, once a month-to-month tenant successfully asserts the
defense of retaliation, the court must determine the period during which the
landlord will be prohibited from instituting another action for possession.8 2
One New York court, attempting to resolve this issue prior to the enactment
of section 223-b, stated that such a tenant should be given enough time to
make other living arrangements. 83 Another judicial answer has been to allow
the tenant to remain in possession until the landlord's "illegal purpose is
dissipated."84 Under this standard, "[t]he question of permissible or imper-
missible purpose is one of fact for the court or jury."85 This standard is not
desirable because it does not firmly establish a definite grace period for the
tenant. Instead, it creates the need for yet another judicial determination of
motive in a subsequent action.
A better approach is for courts to set a specific period during which the
landlord may not attempt to evict, and thereafter allow him to do so
regardless of motive. This approach is preferable because it eliminates suc-
cessive possessory actions by persistent landlords. 86 The length of this grace
and after such extension of a tenancy for one year shall not be required to further extend or
continue such tenancy." Id. In this regard, § 223-b represents a significant departure from prior
New York law because courts previously held that there was no way, either legal or equitable, to
renew a lease against the desire of the landlord. Robinson v. Jewett, 116 N.Y- 40, 51. 22 N.E
224, 226-27 (1889); Toms Point Apts. v. Goudzward, 72 Misc. 2d 629, 631. 339 N.Y S.2d 281.
285 (Nassau County Dist. Ct. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 79 Misc. 2d 206. 360 N. YS.2d 366 (App.
Term 2d Dep't 1973). This rule of law, of course, applied when there was no option or automatic
renewal clause in the lease.
81. The year period would be measured from the point at which the tenancy would have been
terminated had the retaliation issue not been raised. See N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b(2)
(McKinney Supp. 1979).
82. Prior to the adoption of § 223-b, a New York court observed that -Isluccessful interposi-
tion of the defense of retaliatory eviction fails to afford [a) tenant any meaningful protection, for it
does not deter [a] landlord from commencing a subsequent proceeding shortly thereafter " 401
Boardwalk Corp. v. Gutzwiller, 82 Misc. 2d 84, 87, 368 N.Y.S.2d 122, 125-26 (Long Beach City
Ct. 1975).
83. Markese v. Cooper, 70 Misc. 2d 478, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63 (Monroe County Ct- 1972).
Specifically, the court wanted to allow a tenant "sufficient time, without the pressure normally
exerted in a holdover eviction proceeding, to find other suitable housing" Id at 489, 333
N.Y.S.2d at 75.
84. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1968). cert- denied. 393 U S_ 1016
(1969); Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 517, 476 P.2d 97. 103. 90 Cal. Rptr. 729.
735 (1970) (en banc); Toms Point Apts. v. Goudzward. 72 Misc.2d 629. 633. 339 N Y S-2d 281,
287 (Nassau County Dist. Ct. 1972). aff'd per curiant, 79 Misc 2d 206. 360 N.Y.S.2d 366 tApp.
Term 2d Dep't 1973); Markese v. Cooper, 70 Misc. 2d 478, 489, 333 N.Y.S 2d 63, 75 (Monroe
County Ct. 1972).
85. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1968) cert. denied, 393 U S 1016
(1969).
86. This approach would also eliminate the need for courts to decide how many times per
year a month-to-month tenant, for example, will be permitted to assert the retaliatory defense.
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period should be established by courts on a case-by-case basis. At a minimum,
the tenant should be allowed adequate time to obtain another residence; at
most, courts should permit the retaliatory protection to extend for one year as
provided in section 223-b.8 7
Another issue arises from the language in section 223-b which provides that
a successful tenant may remain in possession.38 Under this language, it is
possible for a court to order the landlord to grant another lease with the exact
terms of the original lease. 8 9 Such an order may entitle the tenant to remain in
possession at the same rental charge. The landlord, however, may have
planned to raise the rent upon the tenant's ouster. Thus, he will not only be
prevented from getting a new tenant, but must also forego the planned rent
increase. Moreover, while other tenants in the same building must pay rent
increases when their leases expire, the tenant who was retaliated against may
enjoy rent and eviction protection for possibly another year.90 The protections
of section 223-b, therefore, may result in a type of rent control. In order to
avoid this effect, courts should allow landlords who have been ordered to
extend a tenancy to present data in support of a rent increase. 9 1 If it is
established that the increase is uniform throughout the building, then it
should be allowed.
B. Damages
Section 223-b allows a tenant to recover damages caused by retaliation by a
landlord. 92 Neither section 223-b nor previous New York case law, however,
provides specific guidelines concerning the type or amount of damages flowing
from a retaliatory eviction action. 93
In Markese v. Cooper,94 which declared the existence of a damage cause of
action for retaliatory eviction in New York prior to the enactment of section
California allows the defense of retaliation to be invoked by a tenant only once per year. Cal.
Civ. Code § 1942.5(b) (West Supp. 1980). Under this law, a month-to-month tenant could be
evicted quite easily by a landlord. Once the tenant successfully uses the defense, he is without
retaliatory protection during the next 12 months, unless the court establishes a grace period.
87. There is nothing in the legislative history which indicates the length of time that a
periodic tenant may stay. A landlord, however, cannot be required to continue a tenancy based
on a lease for more than a year. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b(2) (McKinney Supp. 1979). It
would be consistent to apply this limit to the extension of periodic tenancies.
88. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b(2) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
89. See id.
90. The Connecticut statute specifically permits a landlord to increase the rent following
determination of retaliation where the landlord has incurred increased operating costs and taxes.
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 47a-20(b)(2), as amended by Pub. Act No. 79-571, reprinted in Conn,
Public and Special Acts 876, Jan. 1979.
91. This possible rent control effect may also appear in cases in which the landlord has
attempted to increase the rent in retaliation. The landlord risks this result whenever he unwisely
doubles or triples the rent in attempting to force indirectly a tenant to vacate.
92. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 223-b(3) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
93. Some states explcitly provide guidelines as to the types and amount of damages with
regard to retaliatory eviction. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 25, § 5516(d) (1975) (three months'
rent or treble damages, %% hichever is greater, and cost of the suit); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 383.655-.705(2)
(Supp. 1978) (up to three months' rent and a reasonable attorney's fee).
94. 70 Misc. 2d 478, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63 (Monroe County Ct. 1972).
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223-b, the court stated that there could be a recovery of "compensator) and
special damages, and, in a proper case, ... exemplary or punitive as well."' 9-
The court did not elaborate or indicate the precise point in time upon which
damages could be obtained. The cases cited by the court in Markese as a basis
for damages involved a landlord's forcible dispossession of a tenant during the
rental period, 9 6 a landlord's failure to deliver possession at the beginning of a
rental period, 97 and an encroachment in violation of a restrictive covenant. 98
None of these cases are similar to a retaliatory eviction.9 9 Thus, although
Markese provides general guidance, New York courts will have to break new
ground in determining the compensable elements flowing from a retaliatory
eviction in various factual settings.
To determine appropriate damages for retaliatory eviction, it is helpful to
compare that situation with wrongful eviction. In the usual wrongful eviction,
the tenant has been actually or constructively evicted from the premises by
the landlord during the rental period. 00 Damages vary depending upon the
theory behind the cause of action. If a contractual theory is used, a successful
damage cause of action yields the difference between the fair market value of
the remainder of the rental term and the rent reserved in the rental agreement
for the period of eviction. 10 1 Alternatively, a successful tort action results in
the recovery of damages proximately caused by the eviction. 1
02
Although a retaliatory eviction can be similar in form to a wrongful
95. Id. at 489, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 75 (citations omitted)
96. Eten v. Luyster, 60 N.Y. 252 (1875); I.H.P. Corp. v. 210 Cent. Park S Corp., 16 A-D.2d
461, 228 N.Y.S.2d 883 (lst Dep't 1962), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 329, 239 N.Y S 2d 547. 189 N-E.2d
812 (1963).
97. Burkhard v. Morris, 206 A.D. 366, 201 N.Y.S.2d 225 (4th Dep't 1923) (per curiam).
98. Frey Realty Co. v. Ten West 46th St. Corp., 1 Misc 2d 371. 145 N Y S.2d 670 iSup Ct.
1955).
99. They are dissimilar in that the cases cited in Markese concern breach of covenants in a
lease. In contrast, retaliatory eviction, in its most prevalent form, involves the displacement of a
tenant at the end of the rental period. Hence, there is no contract-type breach. See 401
Boardwalk Corp. v. Gutzwiller, 82 Misc. 2d 84, 87, 368 N Y S.2d 122, 125-26 (Long Beach City
Ct. 1975) (rejecting a damage cause of action for retaliatory eviction in the absence of statute)
100. See, e.g., Barash v. Pennsylvania Terminal Real Estate Corp , 26 N Y 2d 77. 83, 308
N.Y.S.2d 649, 653, 256 N.E.2d 707, 710 (1970) (constructive eviction requirements). Seigel v
Neary, 38 Misc. 297, 300, 77 N.Y.S. 854, 857 (App. Term 2d Dep't 1902) (actual eviction)
101. E.g., Clarkson v. Skidmore, 46 N.Y. 297, 302 (1871); Peerless Candy Co v Halbreich,
125 Misc. 889, 892, 211 N.Y.S. 676, 677-78 (App. Term 2d Dep't 1925)- Of course, the tenant is
not liable for any rent during the period of eviction. Seigel v Neary, 38 Mii 297, 300. 77
N.Y.S. 854, 856 (App. Term 2d Dep't 1902).
102. See, e.g., Eten v. Luyster, 60 N.Y. 252, 259-60 (1875) (recovery allowed for injury to
personal property and building of tenant); I.H.P. v. 210 Cent Park S- Corp. 16 A-D-2d 461,
466-67, 228 N.Y.S.2d 883, 888-89 (1st Dep't 1962), afftd, 12 N Y.2d 329, 239 N Y-S 2d 547, 189
N.E.2d 812 (1963) (damage to property and cost of guarding premises to prevent recurrence of
wrongful acts by the landlord, along with punitive damages, recoverable); Lopez v- City of New
York, 78 Misc. 2d 575, 576-77, 357 N.Y.S.2d 659, 660-61 (Civ. Ct N.Y. 1974) (tenant recovered
for loss of earnings, food spoilage, miscellaneous expenses and for mental distress due to the
eviction). In the appropriate case, both contract and tort damages can be obtained Eten v
Luyster, 60 N.Y. 252, 259-61 (1875) (recovery for losses sustained because of the landlord's
trespass, along with the value of the unexpired term following the eviction)
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eviction, such as when a retaliatory reduction in services °3 causes the tenant
to vacate the premises during the rental period, it is usually dissimilar.
Generally, retaliatory eviction concerns a termination at the end of a periodic
tenancy or the refusal to renew a term for years. 104 Under these circumstanc-
es, the tenant is not being "evicted" in the normal sense because the landlord's
action has not occurred during the rental period. Accordingly, a contract
action in this situation should yield no damages. No part of the lease or rental
agreement remains at the time in question. Since contract damages serve to
compensate for a contractual loss, ' 05 a fully performed contract cannot be the
basis for damages because there has been no breach of contract. 106 Hence,
damages must follow tort principles.
The most important factor in a determination of damages is the point in
time at which a claim of retaliation has been raised. For example, if at the
time of litigation the tenant is still in possession and prevails on the issue of
retaliation,' 0 7 it is uncertain whether any damages would be recoverable due
to the landlord's retaliatory motive in attempting to terminate the tenant's
periodic tenancy or refusing to renew a term for years. In Markese v.
Cooper,10 8 the court held that the reason to grant damages is a landlord's
unlawful motive in bringing the eviction proceedings, 10 9 thereby indicating
that the tenant need not have been put out of possession to recover damages.
A recent case in a New York federal court" 0 also held that a tenant could be
awarded damages although there had been no dispossession.", In that case,
the landlord gave proper notice to terminate the tenant's month-to-month
tenancy. The tenant, who was active in a tenants' association, brought an
action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and damages. The landlord
then decided to drop the request to terminate and filed a motion to dismiss the
tenant's complaint. 112 The court ruled that if "the threatened eviction was in
retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment activities, [the tenant] may
recover nominal damages as well as actual damages for proved emotional
103. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
104. See notes 35-38 supra and accompanying text.
105. 11 Williston on Contracts § 1338 (3d ed. 1968).
106. The inapplicability of contract law in this respect is notable, because contract law has
recently been utilized in other areas of landlord tenant relations in order to give tenants greater
rights. In particular, contract principles have been applied to the concept of habitability within
the last 10 years, creating new contractual remedies for tenants. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l
Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072-82 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Goodman v.
Ramirez, 100 Misc. 2d 881, 888-89, 420 N.Y.S.2d 185, 189-90 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1979). See also
Geraci v. Jenrette, 41 N.Y.2d 660, 666, 394 N.Y.S.2d 853, 857, 363 N.E.2d 559, 364 (1977) (a
lease is a contract governed by the Statute of Frauds).
107. Either the tenant has raised the defense of retaliation during a landlord action for
possession or the tenant has initiated the action to prevent eviction after receiving a notice to quit
the premises.
108. 70 Misc. 2d 478, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63 (Monroe County Ct. 1972).
109. Id. at 489, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
110. Davis v. Village Park II Realty Co., 578 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1978).
111. Id. at 464.
112. Id. at 462.
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distress over the prospective loss of her home."'"1 3 This case, then, provides a
basis for the recovery by a tenant of damages despite the fact that there has
been no displacement from the premises.'14
A second possible situation is one in which the tenant has been evicted in re-
taliation at the end of a rental period" ss and subsequently brings an action
solely for damages. If this is the first point in time that the issue of retaliation
is being determined and the court finds that there was a retaliatory motive
under section 223-b, it must decide which of the tenant's financial losses are
compensable. A hypothetical illustrates this point. Assume that the tenant
was paying $200 per month for an apartment which had a fair market value
of $220 per month at the time the tenant vacated. Due to the retaliation the
tenant moves to another apartment of similar quality which rents for $230 per
month, incurring moving expenses of $100. One possible measure of damages
would be the difference between the rent of the tenant's original apartment
and its fair market value at the time of the dispossession for the period of
eviction, in the above example $20 per month."16 Another measure would
involve the difference between the original rent and the new rental cost. This
measure would yield $30 per month. It is submitted that the latter should be
used because it more accurately reflects the actual harm sustained by the
tenant due to the landlord's wrongful act.
This measure has been used in an analogous situation under a rent control
law. In Gorman v. Gould, 117 for example, a tenant vacated premises pursuant
to a certificate of eviction which had been granted to the landlord so that the
premises could be used by the landlord's immediate family. In fact, the
premises were rented to a third party. In the meantime, the tenant had moved
to another apartment with a higher rental charge. ' 18 Since the eviction had
become unlawful under the rent control law because of the improper use by
the landlord of the certificate of eviction, the court held that the tenant was
entitled to damages."19 The applicable statutory provisions stated that the
landlord would" 'be liable to the tenant for three times the damages sustained
on account of such removal' ",120 and the court held that one basis for
113. Id. at 464 (emphasis added). The court indicated that attorneys' fees were also recover-
able. Id.
114. The Maryland retaliatory eviction statute has an interesting approach. It provides for
attorney's fees and costs where, in the eviction proceeding. "the judgment [may] be in favor of the
tenant for any of the aforementioned [retaliatory] defenses." Md. Real Prop. Code Ann. § 8-208 1
(Supp. 1979). T'his provision thereby takes note of the fact that if the tenant thinks he is being
evicted in retaliation and raises a retaliatory defense, then the issue of retaliation will be
determined while the tenant is still in possession. At this point, actual damages are likely to be
non-existent, unless mental distress, if claimed, is recoverable. Once the issue of retaliation is
resolved by the court, there are two possibilities: (1) the tenant wins, remains in possession and
receives compensation for court expenses; or (2) the tenant loses and must vacate.
115. The tenant vacated either pursuant to a notice to quit or because of a large rent increase.
116. As this measure is similar to the one applied in wrongful evictions, see notes 100-01 supra
and accompanying text, it is certainly a questionable measure in that no part of the rental period
remained at the time of eviction. See notes 103-05 supra and accompanying text.
117. 37 Misc. 2d 553, 235 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1962).
118. Id. at 554, 235 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
119. Id. at 554-55, 235 N.Y.S.2d at 958-60.
120. Id. at 555, 235 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
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measurement would be the difference between the rents of the original
apartment and new apartment for a period of two years. 2 '
Although Gorman interpreted a rent control statute, an analogy to section
223-b can be drawn, as both laws provide eviction restrictions. Accordingly, a
tenant who has been evicted in retaliation should be able to recover the
difference in rent between the original and new premises. This would be a
damage cause of action arising out of the landlord's breach of his duty not to
retaliate.
Because a tenancy to which section 223-b is directed is not burdened with
the severe eviction regulations which are present under rent control, a
recovery of this differential for two years would not be appropriate. A fair
measure would allow for the differential to be recovered for up to one year,
since a year is the maximum period for which the tenant could have remained
in possession had the issue of retaliation been raised before the tenant was
evicted. 122 Additionally, moving costs' 23 and emotional distress'2 4 should be
compensable.
Courts should be wary, however, of tenants who, upon moving, have
suddenly discovered, or think they have discovered, the real cause of their
eviction, and who, therefore, raise the issue of retaliation many months after
they have moved.' 25 In any event, section 223-b is governed by a one year
statute of limitations,1 26 which will limit the commencement of such suits.
A third possible scenario is when the issue of retaliation has been decided in
the landlord's favor and the tenant moves out of the premises. On appeal, the
tenant sues for damages, claiming that the landlord had acted in retaliation.
In Pohinan v. Metro Trailer Park, Inc., 127 a New Jersey case with facts similar
to the above, the appellate court reversed the lower court and awarded the
121. Id. at 556, 235 N.Y.S.2d at 960-61.
122. See note 80 supra and accompanying text. In addition, a court may decide to award
separate punitive damages. See, e.g., I.H.P. Corp. v. 210 Cent. Park S. Corp., 16 A.D.2d 461,
466-67, 228 N.Y.S.2d 883, 888-89 (lst Dep't 1962), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 329, 239 N.Y.S.2d 547, 189
N.E.2d 812 (1963); Markese v. Cooper, 70 Misc. 2d 478, 489, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63, 75 (Monroe
County Ct. 1972). For a discussion of the deterrent purpose of punitive damages and tile
requirement of malicious conduct, see Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 404, 223 N.Y.S.2d
488, 490, 179 N.E.2d 497, 498 (1961); Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A
Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1153 (1966).
123. This would be an expense caused by the breach of duty and hence recoverable. Cf.
Burkhard v. Morris, 206 A.D. 366, 367, 201 N.Y.S. 225, 225 (4th Dep't 1923) (per curiam)
(special damages arising out of a lessor's failure to deliver possession to a month-to-month tenant
held to include the cost of moving).
124. E.g., Davis v. Village Park II Realty Co., 578 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1978); Aweeka v.
Bonds, 20 Cal. App. 3d 278, 281-82, 97 Cal. Rptr. 650, 652 (1971). But see Timberlee
Apts. v. Able, 39 Or. App. 93, -, 591 P.2d 399, 401 n. 1 (1979) (no recovery obtained for
mental suffering following a retaliatory eviction).
125. See Frank v. 903 Park Ave. Co., 77 Misc. 2d 421, 423, 354 N.Y.S.2d 329, 331 (Civ. Ct.
N.Y. 1974), aff'd per curiam, 83 Misc. 2d 271, 382 N.Y.S.2d 280 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1975).
126. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 215 (McKinney Supp. 1979). Subdivision seven includes section
223-b of the Real Property Law within the one-year statute of limitations. The statute would start
to run, for example, upon a landlord's serving of a notice to quit.
127. 126 N.J. Super. 114, 312 A.2d 888 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1973).
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tenant compensatory damages. ' 28 Such a holding has interesting implications
for landlords. Resolving the issue of retaliation in the landlord's favor in a
lower court necessarily requires removal of the tenant from the premises.
According to Pohinan, however, the tenant can recover damages long after
the dispossession. The outcome is that the landlord gains possession of the
premises but must pay damages to the tenant. This appears to be both
inefficient and undesirable. One answer to this problem would be to allow
the unsuccessful tenant in the initial court to request an order upon which the
status quo is preserved until the outcome of the appeal. If the tenant does not
choose to appeal, however, the litigation should be considered final, allowing
no further damage suits to be brought by the tenant. 1'2 9
CONCLUSION
The retaliatory eviction prohibition considerably refines the traditional
landlord-tenant relationship. Although a New York landlord remains free to
initially rent to whomever he chooses,' 30 his freedom to discontinue a tenancy
has been limited by section 223-b. While this law provides the foundation for
retaliatory protection, courts will have the responsibility of giving definition to
its ambiguous provisions. The proof procedure and the remedies arising out of
a finding of retaliatory motive are the principal areas of the statute that will
require judicial interpretation. In resolving these issues, courts must keep in
mind the interests of tenants in having protection for reporting housing
violations and exercising constitutional rights, as well as the desire of land-
lords to control rental property. Indeed, the strength of section 223-b is its
ability to balance these two interests in its proof provisions; it embodies the
concern of giving retaliatory protection to tenants while not unduly restricting
evictions in all cases. An additional concern for the courts in applying the law
is the maintenance of the integrity of the summary proceeding. The affirma-
tive defense of retaliation, if abused by tenants, has the potential of seriously
impeding such proceedings brought by landlords. One thing is certain,
however: possessory proceedings will become less summary in nature because
of the introduction of the substantive issue of retaliation.
In any event, the effectiveness of the law will be difficult to measure. It will
not be accurately reflected in the number of times that the issue of retaliation
128. Id. at 123, 312 A.2d at 892.
129. For example, in an Oregon case, a tenant, on appeal from a lower court decision in
which the landlord had gained possession of the premises, sought damages for retaliation The
court of appeals held that since the tenant did not request damages in the possessory action
below, he could not thereafter sue for damages. Timberlee Apts. v. Able. 39 Or App. 93,-. 591
P.2d 399, 401-02 (1979).
130. Kramarsky v. Stahl Management, 92 Misc. 2d 1030, 1032, 401 N.Y-S.2d 943. 945 (Sup.
Ct. 1977) ("Absent a supervening statutory proscription, a landlord is free to do what he wishes
with his property, and to rent or not to rent to any given person at his whim- He may decide
not to rent to singers because they are too noisy. or not to rent to bald-headed men because he has
been told they give wild parties.").
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is raised by tenants. Rather, its success or failure will be verified by the
deterrent effect that it has on retaliatory conduct of landlords. The full impact
of the law, therefore, will be known only by landlords.
Douglas Lowe
